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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE MYSTERY OF THE STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
OLEKSANDR MEREZHKO*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of sovereignty and the concept of state are two fundamental
pillars upon which the entire architecture of contemporary international law,
including its theories and practices, rests. 1 Without these two concepts there
would be no international law at all, for the core of it is the law between
sovereign states, which has been created by the states for themselves. 2 To put it
simply, international law is primarily inter-states law, in which a state is viewed
as a sovereign geopolitical entity. 3
And, yet, both concepts—that of sovereignty and state—present an
unsurmountable difficulty and challenge to the contemporary theory of
international law, which seems unable to formulate coherent and logically
consistent scientific definitions of state and sovereignty. As Professor James
Crawford acknowledges: “Despite its importance, statehood ‘in the sense of
international law’ has not always been a clearly defined concept.” 4 Even the
International Law Commission, while drafting the Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of States, was not able to reach an agreement on the definition of “state.” 5
Professor Crawford himself in his voluminous work devoted to statehood in
international law seems to have failed to present a clear-cut definition of the
state. 6

* Professor Merezhko is the Head of the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Inter-Parliamentry
Cooperation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. He is also serving as the Vice President of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).
1. GIOVANNI DISTEFANO, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SKETCH OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 89 (2019).
2. LUIGI CONDORELLI, CHAPTER 7: CUSTOM, IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND PROSPECTS 179 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
3. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 102, 201 (The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. ed. 10th prtg. 2010).
4. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (2d ed. 2006).
5. Id.
6. Id.
23
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Against this background this paper deals with the concepts of state and
sovereignty from the perspective of the scientific, i.e. psychological, approach,
as developed by Leon Petrażycki in his psychological theory of law. 7
Petrażycki viewed legal phenomena as consisting of unique psychical
processes expressed:
[I]n the unique form of ascribing to different beings (not only to people, but to
beings of various other classes, conceived of in the mind), or to certain classes
of such beings, “duties” and “rights;” so that these beings, so conceived of, are
seemingly found in certain peculiar conditions of being bound or of possessing
special objects (“rights”), and the like. 8

According to this theory, law, including international law, is a psychical
phenomenon which originates in human psyche and which influences human
psyche. 9 Simply put, according to the psychological theory of law, if we wish to
explore the true nature of such phenomena as international law, state,
sovereignty, as well as of other institutions of international law, we should turn
to the study of those psychical processes which take place in the minds of
individuals, instead of looking for them in the external world, where these
phenomena, obviously, do not exist. 10
Thus, based on the methodological basis of this theory, I will present the
concepts of state and sovereignty, as well as the concept of subjects of
international law.
I. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The second most difficult issue for legal theory (after the eternal question
“What is law?”) is the question “What is the state?”—in fact, both questions are
inextricably linked and interrelated, because logically the state, as the legal
positivists claim, on the one hand, produces law (i.e. is a major law-maker) and,
on the other hand, is based upon law and is being regulated by law. 11 This point
equally holds true for the relationship between the concept of the state and
international law, as Alf Ross pointed out:
We have here a vicious circle: in order to determine whether or not a certain rule
is international we must know whether or not the legal community bound by it
is a state. But in order to decide this question we must know precisely whether
or not the rule in question is international. The term “International Law” is
defined with reference to the term “state” and the definition of the term “state”

7. LEON PETRAŻYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY 6 (Hugh W. Babb trans., Harvard Univ. Press
ed. 1955).
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id. at 12, 146.
10. Id. at 6–7.
11. KRZYSZTOF MOTYKA, LEON PETRAŻYCKI, CHALLENGE TO LEGAL ORTHODOXY 35
(2007).
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again refers back to the term “International Law[.”] A definition thus biting on
its own tail is circular. The consequence is that on the point in question the
definition is in reality a blank. 12

Not being able to solve this mystery of the relationship between law and
state logically, some theorists, for instance Hans Kelsen, went as far as offering
to equate law (normative order) and the state. 13
On the other hand, we can see in the international-legal literature a longstanding tradition to personify the state. For example, Polish scholar Ludwik
Ehrlich in his book “Law of Nations” (“Prawo narodów”) pays attention to the
personification of states, which he considers to be an important phenomenon in
international law. 14 In principle, notes Ehrlich, the state is treated as if it was a
natural person, possessing will and able to use this will within its territory with
respect to persons. 15 In this sense the state was substituted for the sovereign
monarch. In human psyche, the state is often represented not as an abstraction
but as a sort of super-human being or creature like Leviathan. 16 Relations
between the states are often perceived of as relations between living persons. 17
To Professor MacCormick, the state is a “personification” exactly in the
same sense that we envisage states as acting beings. 18 In MacCormick’s view
the state is “an acting subject, a subject which acts in (at least) the spheres of
politics, international relations, international law, and domestic public law.” 19
Contemporary international law also attributes to the states certain
inalienable rights, as if they were individuals. The doctrine of these rights
originates from the naturalist teachings. As V.D. Degan notes,
The theory of natural law assimilated States with individual human beings in a
society. According to this teaching, just as natural persons are entitled to some
inherent and absolute rights, so all States being members of the international
community possess some inalienable, indivisible and unassignable rights,
simply because they exist. 20
12. ALF ROSS, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GENERAL PART 12 (The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. ed. 2006).
13. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 182 (Anders Wedberg trans., The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ed., 3d prtg. 2000).
14. LUDWIK EHRLICH, PRAWO NARODÓW 102 (1948).
15. Id.
16. CARL SCHMITT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES: MEANING
AND FAILURE OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL 79 (George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein trans., The Univ. of
Chicago Press ed. 2008).
17. George Lakoff, Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf,
UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY (1991), https://www.arieverhagen.nl/cms/files/George-Lakoff-1991-Meta
phor-and-War.pdf [https://perma.cc/82P7-LDAY].
18. NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 40 (1999).
19. Id.
20. V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1997).
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Among these inalienable states’ rights the following are mentioned: (1) the
right to existence or preservation, i.e. survival; (2) the right to independence or
sovereignty; (3) the right to juridical equality, i.e. equality in law; (4) the right
to be respected; and (5) the right to international communications. 21
These rights look like typical “human” rights, as if the states were human
beings communicating between each other and deserving “respect” from each
other.
What are the most common theoretical mistakes made by the internationallegal theorists writing on the enigma of the state, which prevent them from
understanding the true nature of it?
First of all, contemporary legal theorists are looking for the state in the
wrong place. In fact, the legal theorists still do not know where to locate the
state, searching for it in different kinds of localization beyond human psyche.
These theorists often forget the obvious fact that, from a certain point of
view, everything in the universe can be either a thing (i.e. something material,
tangible), or a person (to be more precise, a living organism), or an idea (i.e. a
content of human psyche). It is apparent that the state is neither a thing nor a
person, even though some theorists tend to perceive the state as some sort of
super-human being. Hence, the state can be located only in our minds; it can be
only a content of human psyche as an idea.
As Petrażycki put it,
The content of traditional legal science is tantamount to an optical illusion: it
does not see legal phenomena where they actually occur, but discerns them
where there is absolutely naught of them—where they cannot be found,
observed, or known—that is to say, in a world external to the subject who is
experiencing the legal phenomena. 22

According to the Polish logician Tadeusz Kotarbiński, one of the serious
logical mistakes is committing a hypostasis (the so-called “hipostaza”), that is,
imagining the existence of some entities merely because there are certain
nouns. 23 Hypostasis (hipostaza), according to him, is the result of
hypostatization, i.e. attribution of real identity to something (e.g., to a concept,
idea) which does not exist in reality. 24 Kotarbiński argued that hypostatization
is dangerous—not so much in practical work of a lawyer but in the course of
creation of scientific legal theories because it can lead to the emergence of
erroneous legal philosophies which ascribe real existence to ideal norms as if
they were persons or things. 25

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 84.
PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 8.
TADEUSZ KOTARBIŃSKI, KURS LOGIKI DLA PRAWNIKÓW 16 (1975).
Id.
Id. at 18.
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In terms of Kotarbiński’s logic, we can argue that in the legal theory based
upon the psychological theory of law we are dealing with judgments (statements,
assertions) in a psychical sense (psychical act of judging), whereas in the
juridical dogmatics law is described by means of judgments in the logical
sense. 26 When someone, holds Kotarbiński, expresses a statement which is
comprehended by the listeners, then in the minds of the listeners appear the
judgment in the psychical sense, and there are as many such judgments as there
are listeners. 27 So, for example, when a professor of law is telling his students
about the state, each of the students in the auditorium has his or her own concept
of the state in his or her mind.
Judgment in the logical sense, according to Kotarbiński, is the meaning
(contents) of the sentence. 28 Kotarbiński argues that he who subscribes to the
existence of the judgment in the logical sense thereby creates an impression that
to all judgments in the psychical sense corresponds one and the same judgment
in the logical sense as a sort of ideal object called “logical judgment.” 29
However, cautions Kotarbiński, claims regarding existence of the judgment in
the logical sense create a temptation leading to the mistake of the hypostasis. 30
To put it differently, when we talk about an ideal phenomenon which does not
exist in time and space (e.g. a legal norm) and which, nevertheless, we can
imagine as if it is a person or thing, then we create an illusion that this object
exists in reality. In a word, a legal scholar should be aware of the mistake of
hypostasis when constructing scientific legal theory. In terms of Petrażycki, he
should avoid “naïve realism,” i.e. mistakenly ascribing to the words or to the
psychical phenomena in our mind’s real existence. 31
Despite this obvious fact, the legal theorists in their efforts to conceptualize
the state continue to commit one of the following mistakes.
First, they make the mistake of what Petrażycki calls “naïve realism” or
“naïve projection” point of view, i.e. they tend to wrongly ascribe a real
existence to the state just because it exists as a psychical reality, as an idea, in
our minds. 32 This erroneous approach to the state stems from the
anthropomorphic tendencies of the human mind: to the human mind, states look
like (or are psychically represented as and experienced in our minds as) persons,
who communicate with each other, quarrel with one other, make treaties, and

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 54.
Id.
KOTARBIŃSKI, supra note 23, at 54.
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 55.
PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 9–10.
Id. at 129.
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become friends or enemies. 33 In the international legal documents this
anthropomorphic approach is discernible when we encounter such concepts as
“will” of a state or “intent” of a state, i.e. when we ascribe to the states psychical
attributes as if the states were living persons. 34
A typical example of such a mistake in contemporary international-legal
theory is a currently popular concept of international law by Professor
Koskenniemi, who writes:
A law which would lack distance from State behaviour, will or interest would
amount to a non-normative apology, a mere sociological description. A law
which would base itself on principles which are unrelated to State behavior, will
or interest would seem utopian, incapable of demonstrating its own content in
any reliable way. To show that international law exists, with some degree of
reality, the modern lawyer needs to show that the law is simultaneously
normative and concrete – that it binds a State regardless of that State’s behavior,
will or interest but that its content can nevertheless be verified by reference to
actual State behavior, will or interest. 35

In these words Professor Koskenniemi paints a picture of states’ “behavior”
as if the states were living creatures possessing their own “will” and
“interests.” 36 He does not explain here what exactly he means by “reality” of
international law: is it a physical, psychical, or some kind of other “reality?”
As Petrażycki pointed out, “the terminology of jurists and their ideas of law
rest upon a naïve-projection point of view which accepts as real legal phenomena
impulsion phantasmata: norms (‘commands’ and ‘prohibitions’) addressed to
persons subject to the law and the legal relations between individuals (their
obligations and their rights).” 37
This naïve-projection point of view, maintained Petrażycki, raises a whole
series of essentially insoluble problems as to the nature of the corresponding
realities, including the state, and the jurists resort to fictitious, arbitrary, and
fanciful speculations like nonexistent “wills” of the states. 38
The second mistake made by legal theorists is the “naïve-nihilistic”
approach to the state and other subjects of international law. This occurs when
some legal theorists mistakenly deny, as Petrażycki would put it, “the existence
of a subject (which undoubtedly exists and can be readily found in the subject’s

33. George Lakoff, Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf,
UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY (1991), https://www.arieverhagen.nl/cms/files/George-Lakoff-1991-Meta
phor-and-War.pdf [https://perma.cc/82P7-LDAY].
34. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 128–129.
35. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 17 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
36. Id. at 59.
37. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 62.
38. Id.
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very judgement) and therefore the existence of the judgement itself, because of
disbelief in the existence of an irrelevant object in an improper sphere.” 39
For instance, this mistake is made by those theorists who deny the existence
of the state as any kind of reality just because we cannot find the state in the
external world as a material thing or a living organism. 40 To these theorists, the
state is, in the final analysis, nothing but an aggregate of individuals. 41
For example, to Hans Kelsen the state is a sort of “fictitious person” to which
we attribute (or impute) the acts of certain natural persons; and this “attribution”
is also a fiction to him. 42
Finally, there is a group of legal theorists who, instead of exploring the true
nature of the state as a psychical phenomenon, engage in the construction of
diverse fantastic concepts (e.g. state as an “organic whole,” social organism,
person, etc.). 43 Such erroneous theories were described by Petrażycki as the
“naïve-speculative” or “naïve-constructive” theories because the legal theorists
are trying to postulate the state’s existence beyond human psyche. 44
The contemporary international-legal scholarship seems perplexed by the
true nature of the state. An example of this is the following statement by
Professor Crawford, who wrote: “A State is not a fact in the sense that a chair is
a fact; it is a fact in the sense in which it may be said a treaty is a fact: that is, a
legal status attaching to certain state of affairs by virtue of certain rules . . . .” 45
As we can see from this statement, Professor Crawford, on the one hand,
acknowledges that the state is not a thing, is not “a fact” in material sense, yet,
on the other hand, he does not explain where this “fact” can be found: in the
human mind or beyond it. 46
At the same time, Professor Crawford’s comparison between the state and a
treaty is quite correct, for both the state and treaty have the same psychical
nature, both of them are the psychical “fact,” existing in the minds of
individuals. 47
Hans Kelsen, who was also a critic of the naïve-realistic perception of the
state, came very close to the understanding of the true nature of the state. 48
Kelsen, writing about the state as a specific legal order, rightly pointed out that
39. Id. at 10.
40. DAVID RUNCIMAN, THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A FICTION, IN
STATES AND CITIZENS: HISTORY, THEORY, PROSPECTS 28–29 (Quentin Skinner & Bo Strath eds.,
2003).
41. KELSEN, supra note 13, at 255.
42. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 299–300 (Univ. Cal. Press 1967) (1934).
43. LEON PETRAŻYCKI, TEORIJA PRAVA I GOSUDARSTVA V SVJAZI S TEORIJEJ
NRAVSTVENNOSTI 165–66 (2000)
44. Id. at 167.
45. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 5.
46. Id.
47. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 43, at 362.
48. KELSEN, supra note 3, at 430.
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“the state is believed to be an object of regulation only because the
anthropomorphic personification of this order leads us first to liken it to a human
individual and then to mistake it for a superhuman individual.” 49
In other words, he was critical about what he called “the inadmissible
hypostatization” of the state. 50
Interestingly enough, in his early works, Kelsen, being aware of the
psychical nature of the state, conceived of the state as “a personifying fiction,”
an idea which formed a parallel to the idea of God. 51 Kelsen considered “the
meta-legal state, transcending the law” to be nothing else than the hypostatized
personification. 52 According to him, the unity of the state, postulated as real, was
similar to “the supernatural deity transcending nature, who is nothing else than
the grandiose anthropomorphic personification of the unity of nature itself.” 53
It can be argued that in principle Kelsen, just like Petrażycki, postulated the
psychical nature of the state as an idea in the mind of the individual. 54 At the
same time, he was not quite consistent in his reasoning, because he had stopped
short of acknowledging the psychical nature of law, which is created by the state
(as legal positivists claim) or which is the synonym of the state (as Kelsen
thought). 55
It is of interest to us that Kelsen tried to comprehend and describe the sociopsychical evolution of the state. To him, the state, as a social phenomenon
(“social bond”), manifested itself in “the idea of a certain community, of
common organization, of common territory, etc.” 56 In his view, the state is “the
guiding idea,” an ideology, the realization of which is a psychical process
leading to the closer ties between the members of the social group. 57
At a certain point in the socio-psychical evolution of the social group the
idea of the leader of the group (as a personification of this group in the minds of
its members) yields to the abstract idea of the state. 58
Kelsen recognized that only the subjective psychical processes in the mind
of an individual are real, and that this is a psychical reality. 59 As for the
“objectivity” of the social institutions, including the state, it remained to him

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Hans Kelsen, The Conception of the State and Social Psychology With Special Reference
to Freud’s Group Theory, 5 INT’L J. OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 1, 37 (1924).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. KELSEN, supra note 13, at 182.
56. KELSEN, supra note 51, at 6.
57. Id. at 6, 23.
58. Id. at 23.
59. Id.
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enigmatic how the real psychical subjectivity can, by mere aggregation or
multiplication, become an equally real social objectivity. 60
Parallelism of the psychical processes taking place in a society, argued
Kelsen, can create a tendency to declare the “folk-spirit” or “common will,”
“common emotion,” to be a psychical reality differing from the individual
psyche, whereby these conceptions might acquire the metaphysical character of
the Hegelian “objective spirit.” 61
Kelsen’s thoughts on the state can be compared to that of Mikhail Reisner,
who tried to elaborate his own socio-psychological concept of the state on the
methodological foundation of Petrażycki’s teaching. 62 In his seminal book, “The
State,” Rejsner, having consistently applied psychological method to the
teaching on the state, had presented it as a socio-psychical phenomenon, as an
ideology, as well as an organized by means of this ideology “mass human
behavior.” 63 Three elements of the state (territory, population, and power),
according to Rejsner, are not tangible, material phenomena but, rather, concepts
or ideas, by means of which the political behavior of people is being organized. 64
In the state’s structure Rejsner distinguishes three elements: (1) human psyche,
as a major source of the state’s ideology; (2) ideology itself, which is dependent
upon concrete historical conditions; and (3) political behavior of people, as a
result of the expression of state’s ideas in human life and activities. 65 He also
came to the conclusion that from the scientific point of view such concepts as
“the omnipresent state power,” “unity of people in the state,” and “territorial
supremacy” are nothing but fictions. 66
In regard to Kelsen’s teaching, it can be argued that he tried to find the
answers to the same questions as Petrażycki and, at least initially, had been
looking for those answers in the same place as Petrażycki did, that is, in the
psyche of individuals. 67 However, at the end of the day, he chose a different
methodological path in the legal science by opting for the juridical-dogmatic,
instead of psychological, approach to law and state. 68
Later on, Kelsen had started to draw parallels between the state and the
corporation. He wrote:
The state is, of course, not a natural or physical person, not a man or a
superman. It is a so called juristic person, or, what amounts to the same, a
60.
61.
62.
(1911).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
KELSEN, supra note 51, at 23.
MIKHAIL REISNER, GOSUDARSTVO, CHAST’ I. KUL’TURNO-ISTORICHESKIE OSNOVY 18
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Kelsen, supra note 51, at 2.
KELSEN, supra note 42, at 105.
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corporation. As a juristic person the state is personification of a social order,
constituting the community we call “state.” If we try to characterize the
phenomenon “state” without using a personification, we have no other
possibility than to say that the state is a social order, or the community
constituted by this order . . . . 69

In this passage from Kelsen we have a rather typical example of conflation
of three different concepts of the state: (1) state as a psychical representation in
the minds of individuals (“personification” of social or legal order in the psyche
of individuals); (2) state as a social group (sociological concept of the state); and
(3) state as a formal-legal construction, as a range of legal norms (juridicaldogmatic concept of the state). 70
The point is that we should not mix together these three different concepts
of the state, but instead we should carefully distinguish them from one another.
Another error, often made by the legal theorists in their attempts to
conceptualize the state, is a conflation of the theoretical and practical
approaches, which should be strictly distinguished. The theoretical approach
explores the state as a phenomenon of reality as it is, not what it should be. 71
This is the only scientific approach, if we understand by science the realm of
knowledge dealing with reality, not metaphysics. 72 Practical approach to the
state is, in its turn, about the state as it should be, as it is expressed in the legal
norms. 73 In terms of the Kelsen theory we can say that legal theory studies the
state as a phenomenon of “isness,” whereas practical approach explores the state
as belonging to the realm of “oughtness.” 74
But what is the state in international-legal theory; how is it presented?
There are no international-legal norms of general international law which
would define the state. International-legal theory is also helpless, when it comes
to the scientific definition of the state.
The international document most widely quoted in connection with the
concept of statehood in international law is the Montevideo Convention on
Rights and Duties of States of 1933, which holds: “[t]he State as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with other States.” 75

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

KELSEN, supra note 3, at 100.
Id.
L.I. PETRAŻYCKI, TEORIJA I POLITIKA PRAVA. IZBRANNYE TRUDY, 241 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 421–22.
CARLOS MIGUEL HERRERA, LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT DE HANS KELSEN, UNE
INTRODUCTION 17 (2004).
75. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, signed with reservations
Dec. 26, 1933.
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This formulation, sometimes with slight nuances, has been widely accepted
in international-legal theory. 76 So, traditionally, the state in international law is
described as an entity constituted by three elements: (1) territory, ( 2) population,
and (3) government. 77
From the traditional international-legal theory perspective a state exists as
long as these criteria are met, and there is no need in its recognition on the part
of the other states. 78
To illustrate how ludicrous and far from reality this concept of the state can
be, we can give the following examples from the field of international relations.
The case in point is Taiwan (officially “The Republic of China”) which
possesses all the attributes of a sovereign state and, yet, does not consider itself
to be a de jure independent state. 79 Taiwan presents a hard case for those
theorists who believe that the best hallmark of statehood in international law is
membership in the UN, because Taiwan used to represent China on the Security
Council until 1971. 80
Another example is Kosovo. The question here is whether or not it is a
sovereign state under international law. If we apply the criteria of statehood that
are offered by the international-legal doctrine, then we should regard Kosovo as
a sovereign state, because it has its territory, population, and government.
Moreover, it is recognized as a state by a number of states and maintains
diplomatic relations with them. It seems that Kosovo is a state for some states
(e.g. for the US and a number of the European states), while for the other states
it is not an independent state. 81 For Serbia, for instance, Kosovo is not a
sovereign state, but an integral part of its territory. 82
Interestingly, from the juridical-dogmatic point of view, the legal status of
Kosovo remains indeterminate. So, those who recognize Kosovo as a sovereign
state refer to the normative fact in the form of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the
unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, whereas those who
view it as a part of Serbia refer to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244
(1999) in which the UN member-states reaffirmed their “commitment to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” 83
76. LUNG-CHU CHEN, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, A POLICY-ORIENTED
PERSPECTIVE 26 (3d ed. 2015).
77. Id.
78. THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES, LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND
EVOLUTION, 5–6 (1999).
79. FRANCK CHIANG, THE ONE-CHINA POLICY: STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TAIWAN’S
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS xix (2018).
80. Id. at 274.
81. JOHN DUGARD, THE SECESSION OF STATES AND THEIR RECOGNITION IN THE WAKE OF
KOSOVO 206 (Brill & Nijhoff eds., 2013).
82. GERGANA NOUTCHEVA, EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CHALLENGES OF
BALKAN ACCESSION, CONDITIONALITY, LEGITIMACY AND COMPLIANCE 141 (2012).
83. S.C. Res. 1244, 10 (June 10, 1999) (on the situation regarding Kosovo).
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These examples clearly indicate that in the realm of juridical dogmatics, the
logical law (principle) of the excluded third does not hold.
Another example is Northern Cyprus (officially “the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus”), which is a sovereign state for Turkey, but not for other
states. 84
There is also a number of other such states, the so-called “unrecognized
states” or “semi-recognized” states. 85 Again, if we apply the abovementioned
criteria of statehood, we can argue that they are sovereign states. Moreover, it
can be equally argued that ISIS is also a sovereign state, because it has its own,
however specific it might be, territory, population, and government. 86
These criteria, which are offered for the determination of statehood, are also
unreliable when taken separately.
First of all, as regards territory, history of mankind knows examples of states
which did not have permanent territory, such as nomadic empires. That is why
the statement that “a state without a territory is not possible” is historically
wrong. 87
The definition of the state territory given in international-legal doctrine is
circular and contains logical mistake definitio per idem. Let us consider as an
example of this mistake the following definition: “[s]tate territory is that defined
portion of the globe which is subjected to the sovereignty of a state.” 88
This definition is logically erroneous because X (state territory) is defined
through X (state territory as a constitutive element of state). Additionally, there
is another X in this formula: state sovereignty, which also constitutes an element
of the state.
Different states and individuals can consider the same territory as belonging
to different states. A case in point is Crimea. 89
The concept of population might be equally confusing, because in reality
there is no such a thing as a permanent population: people are born, die, travel
abroad, come as immigrants, and leave as emigrants. There is also such subject
of international law as the Holy See which has no population, apart from resident
functionaries, with the purpose to support it as a religious organization. 90

84. MEHMET NECATI MÜNIR ERTEKÜN, THE STATUS OF THE TWO PEOPLES IN CYPRUS:
LEGAL OPINIONS 104 (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Public Information Office 1997).
85. See UNRECOGNIZED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 3–4 (Nina Caspersen and
Gareth Stansfield eds. 2011).
86. FAWAZ A. GERGEZ, ISIS: A HISTORY 42 (2016).
87. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992).
88. Id.
89. Oleksandr Merezhko, Crimea’s Annexation in the Light of International Law, A Critique
of Russia’s Legal Argumentation, KYIV-MOHYLA LAW AND POLITICS JOURNAL 2, 37–39 (2016).
90. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (8th
ed. 2012).
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As for the government, in the case of a civil war within given territory there
might be not one, but several different “governments” claiming to be the only
“legitimate” government.
All these examples illustrate to us the point that territory, population, and
governments are not something material, nor are they some kind of things, but,
rather, they are ideas present in the minds of individuals.
The same also holds true for the state: for it is not a thing or person, but a
psychical representation in the consciousness of an individual. In other words,
in the consciousness of one individual a certain social group might be a
sovereign state, while for the other it might be not an independent state, but
something else: for instance, a social group within a state.
Such a difference between legal convictions of different individuals on the
existence or non-existence of a particular state is, at least potentially, a cause of
serious conflicts in international relations. Each of these disputing individuals to
substantiate his or her position might refer to different legal rules and
documents. And one of the best ways to settle such a dispute would be to refer
it for solution by a third party, for instance, to an international tribunal or a court
of arbitration.
The mystery of the state in international law can be unraveled only on the
basis of the psychological theory of law. This theory of law, as a phenomenon
of the psychical (not physical) reality, is a specific imperative-attributive
impulsion (in terms of Leon Petrażycki, a “legal emotion”). 91 As an imperativeattributive impulsion, law represents a psychical experience of bilateral
character: it combines both obligation (duty) and claim (right). 92
To put it simply, law is in the mind of that person who experiences legal
judgment and we should not confuse law with the forms of its expression and
objectivation (such as legal text).
Petrażycki wrote:
The prevailing view holds that possession of a definite territory is an essential
element of a state. Tradition distinguishes three elements in the state: territory,
population, and authority. It must, therefore, be emphasized with particular force
that neither a definite territory nor a settled population is of any significance
whatsoever from the point of view of the psychological theory that the state
organization consists of impulsive-intellectual phenomena . . . plus the
corresponding coordinated behavior. Even nomad social groups, or groups
formerly settled but later shifting to other territories under the power and
leadership of their princes are to be included in the class “state”. . . 93

91. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 35.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 135.
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In other words, the elements of a state, such as territory, population, and
government, are also objects of representation in the human psyche. 94
To sum up, in Petrażycki’s teaching the state is either a social group in which
the supreme power belongs (that is to say, is projected; ascribed by the national
legal mentality) to various beings (such as gods, monarchs, supreme councils,
parliaments, etc.) or an object of representation in a human psyche. 95 He also
does not deny the juridical-dogmatic concept of the state. 96
Thus, talking about the nature of the state we can distinguish three
approaches to its analysis leading to three different concepts of the state: (1)
psychological approach, (2) sociological, and (3) juridical-dogmatic.
All three approaches to the state differ, and the concepts built upon them
should not be conflated and should be kept apart.
From the psychological perspective the state is a psychical projection in the
mind of an individual. At the same time the state might be (but not always is) a
psychical representation of a certain social reality in the psyche of the individual.
In other words, the idea of the state in the mind of an individual might “mirror”
a certain social reality. 97
The sociological concept of the state postulates the state as a social reality,
as an independent social group united by the legal convictions of the people
which are manifested in their coordinated behavior. 98 It should be also noted that
the Weberian sociological view of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force
as the principal hallmark of statehood is dubious. 99 The trouble with this
definition of the state is that the term “legitimate” presupposes existence of law,
and the question arises: what is the law and who makes it? If it is the state which
makes the law, then we have circularity in this definition.
In our opinion, the juridical-dogmatic concept of the state views it as a range
of normative facts or as a set of legal norms linked to each other logically.
The interesting and complicated issues arise when we try to understand the
relationships between these three concepts of the state. The scheme of these
relationships might look as follows: the psychical representation of a state in the
mind of an individual represents a certain “social reality” in the form of the
coordinated behavior of individuals which can be observed. 100 On the other
hand, in our opinion, the psychical representation of the state in the individual’s
mind does not necessarily represent any “social reality,” or it might “distort” the
“social reality.” For instance, despite such “social reality” as Taiwan in the
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 132–136.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 136.
ANDREAS ANTER, MAX WEBER’S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE, ORIGINS,
STRUCTURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 31–32 (Palgrave Macmillan 2014).
100. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 133.
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capacity of an independent social entity, different international lawyers view it
differently. 101
The psychical reality of the state, in turn, might find its expression in the
legal norms with which deals juridical dogmatics. At the same time, different
dogmaticians can refer to different normative facts to “prove” or “disprove” the
existence of a particular state. 102 For example, Turkish lawyers might refer to
the normative fact related to the recognition of Northern Cyprus as a sovereign
state by Turkey; while other lawyers might refer to the corresponding Security
Council resolution as a normative fact precluding recognition of Northern
Cyprus as a sovereign state.
The best way to solve such conflicts of different normative facts is to refer
the issue to the third party, i.e. to an international court or arbitration.
A.

Identity and Continuity of States

Basically, the concept of the state’s continuity is about the idea that a state’s
existence is undisturbed by any change of its government. 103 Before the
seventeenth century there was the notion that each reign was a separate
sovereignty unfettered by earlier treaty commitments, and it was due to the fact
that national legal consciousness ascribed sovereignty (i.e. the highest authority
in the state) to the individual (i.e. to the monarch or sovereign). 104 Over the
course of the seventeenth century in the mass legal consciousness, a psychical
revolution occurred as a result of which the sovereignty started to ascribe not to
the idea of the monarch but to the abstract idea of the state. 105 As M.J. Peterson
puts it:
The new rule posited that a monarch’s public treaties bound any successor –
whether an heir, a usurper, or revolutionaries establishing a non-monarchical
government. Well before 1815, then, there was consensus that the state’s own
international legal personality, and with it the rights and duties it holds under
both general international law and the specific treaties to which it is a party,
remained undisturbed by any change of government. 106

Another idea which took hold in the mass legal consciousness at that time
was that the state is possessor of complete legal personality under international
law, whereas the governments are only “the human agents” of states having only
those rights and obligations which are necessary to perform this role. 107 In other

101. CHIANG, supra note 79, at xxiv.
102. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 33.
103. M.J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS, LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE
PRACTICE, 1815–1995 20 (St. Martin’s Press, Inc. 1997).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 185.
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words, in the legal consciousness the idea of the government was subjected to
the idea of the state. 108
In the interwar period, due to a wave of revolutions in Europe, an idea
emerged that a great enough transformation (e.g., social revolution in Russia in
1917) might amount to the creation of a new state. 109 First Soviet lawyers, for
instance, had argued that there is no identity or continuity between the new
Soviet state and the Russian Empire, that they are two different states and two
different subjects of international law. 110 The European states, however,
continued to see Soviet Russia as the same state subject to international law and
considered the Soviet government to be obliged to pay the Tsarist debts. 111
In contemporary international law, continuity and identity of states basically
mean that a state continues its existence (preserves its identity) as the same
person, despite changes (sometimes considerable) in its population, territory,
and government. 112 For example, a state might undergo substantial
transformation (change its name, constitution, political regime, borders, etc.)
and yet continue to be regarded as the same state and the same subject of
international law. 113 A case in point is Germany, which despite tremendous
changes in territory, political system, and population during the twentieth
century, had preserved its identity as a state. Poland preserved its identity since
1918 even when it was under occupation during World War II.
An even more curious example is Russia’s status as the self-proclaimed
“continuator” of the USSR despite the fact that Russia (the Russian Soviet
Federative Republic) and the USSR were two different states.
These examples illustrate to us how artificial the concept of the state can be
when taken beyond its psychical nature. The thing is that the identity/continuity
of the state is not something existing in the external world, but a psychical
phenomenon. In reality, the state’s identity/continuity exists in the minds of
individuals, e.g. politicians and statespersons. For example: in the minds of the
Soviet statespersons the FRG had emerged in 1949, whereas German
statespersons believed that there has been continuity of the German State since
1871, despite all political transformations. 114
The birth and death of a state also occurs in the minds of individuals. Hans
Kelsen with respect to the birth and death of a state writes:

108. PETERSON, supra note 103, at 185.
109. TARJA LÅNGSTRÖM, TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 435
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 188–89.
112. CRAWFORD, supra note 90, at 412–13.
113. Id. at 128.
114. S.V. CHERNICHENKO, KONTINUITET, IDENTICHNOST’ I PRAVOPREEMSTVO GOSUDARSTV
26 (1998).
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It is generally recognized that the question whether a new state has come into
existence or an old state has ceased to exist is to be answered on the basis of
international law. The relevant principles of international law are commonly
stated as follows: A state comes into existence when a group of individuals
living on a definite territory are organized under an effective and independent
government; and a state ceases to exist when it loses one of its essential
elements—population, its territory, or its independent effective government. A
government is independent if it is not legally under the influence of the
government of another state; and it is effective if it is able to obtain permanent
obedience to the coercive order issued by it. 115

From the psychological theory’s perspective, the situation looks different.
A state comes into existence when a majority of the individuals living in the
given territory start to believe that they live in one state, i.e. when they ascribe
in their minds the corresponding rights to those people whom they consider to
be their government. On the other hand, a state ceases to exist when the majority
of its population stops believing in this state and stops ascribing the highest
authority to the individuals constituting the government of this state. Sometimes,
to make a psychical revolution in the minds of the population of the given
territory, leading to the death of a state, it is enough to adopt a normative fact,
e.g. a declaration of independence, as was the case with the Soviet republics in
1991 after the aborted coup d’état in Moscow.
As for the government’s “effectiveness,” Kelsen writes, it does not depend
on the government’s ability “to obtain permanent obedience to the coercive
order,” because legal order and the state are not based on coercion, but rather on
the people’s voluntary submission, stemming from their natural psychical
tendency to ascribe the highest authority to the individuals whom they consider
to be their government. 116
B.

Recognition of States

Historically, international law, as a European international law (Jus
Publicum Europaeum), had been a sort of rules of the exclusive club of the
European states, which considered themselves to be “civilized” and which
decided who, and on what conditions, should be admitted to membership in this
club. 117 In fact, to be admitted to that international community of the “civilized”
states, an entity should have been “recognized” by the members of that
community. 118 Hence, this is the constitutive effect of recognition and popularity
of the constitutive theory of recognition among legal theorists at that time. 119
115. KELSEN, supra note 63, at 258–259.
116. KELSEN, supra note 13, at 220.
117. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 13
(Routledge 7th ed. 1997).
118. Id. at 83.
119. Id.
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Later on, in view of the emergence of the new national-states on the ruins of the
empires, especially after World War I and during the decolonization of the
sixties, the constitutive theory of recognition yielded to the declaratory theory,
which claims that the state is being born from the fact, which does not need
recognition on the part of other states. 120 The proponents of the declaratory
theory of recognition liked to recall the story with Napoleon, who, when offered
to recognize the existence of the French Republic, responded that it “did not
require or desire recognition,” because “it is already as the sun on the horizon in
Europe.” 121
However, nowadays we can observe a sort of revival of the constitutive
theory of recognition, because in the disputable cases the best criterion to
determine the existence of the state is its admission to the United Nations as a
member-state. 122 This admission might be viewed as having a constitutive effect
for the state’s existence as a subject of international law.
In traditional international-legal doctrine, recognition remains a riddle
because there are no clear and objective criteria to determine conditions for
recognition. According to some international-legal theorists, “premature”
recognition of an entity seeking to secede from an existing state before that
entity’s consolidation as an independent state amounts to violation of the general
rules of international law. 123 Such premature recognition might be viewed as an
unlawful intervention. 124 However, as the case of the “unrecognized” or de facto
states indicate, international law does not provide any reliable guidance as to the
moment when a given entity becomes an independent state.
Hans Kelsen points out that international law leaves the decision on the
recognition of a given community as a state to the interested governments,
because, according to him, legal recognition of a community as a state is “only
a particular case of the general principle according to which the existence of
facts to which international law attaches legal consequence has to be ascertained
by the governments which are interested in these facts in a concrete case.” 125
In reality it means that those individuals, of whom the government is
composed, should decide whether or not the given community is a state.
An interesting case in connection with the issue of states’ recognition in
international law presents the case of Kosovo which became the subject matter

120. Id.
121. IN THE WORDS OF NAPOLEON: THE EMPEROR DAY BY DAY 41 (R.M. Johnston ed.,
Frontline Books 2016).
122. DAVID RAIC, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 41 (2002).
123. See Christian Tomuschat, Recognition of New States—The Case of Premature Recognition
in Kosovo and International Law, in KOSOVO AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (Peter Hilpold ed.,
2012).
124. RAIC, supra note 122, at 82–83.
125. KELSEN, supra note 3, at 269.
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of heated debates among international lawyers from different countries. For
instance, Christian Tomuschat in this respect notes:
The recognition of a State must be considered as unlawful if the territorial entity
concerned is unable, under any conceivable aspect, to meet the minimum
requirement of statehood. States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. But their
discretion is not boundless. In principle the criteria of statehood are beyond
question. 126

This statement might be interpreted in the following way: the freedom of
states to recognize other entities as states is not unlawful in so far as the entity
in question possesses the necessary features of a state, such as territory,
population, and government. If so, then any of the “unrecognized states” can be
recognized by other states and this move will not be regarded as a violation of
the existent states’ territorial integrity.
At the same time, Professor Tomuschat acknowledges that “as far as the
population is concerned, the first question is who decides about its
composition.” 127
Again, it can be argued that for some theorists or statesmen in case of
Kosovo “the population” means population of Kosovo, whereas for others there
is only one “population,” which is the population of the whole of Serbia, its
“people” which has the right to self-determination. 128
Nowadays the states’ practice supports the declaratory theory of recognition,
according to which “the legal effects of recognition are limited: recognition is a
declaration or acknowledgment of an existing state of law and fact, legal
personality having been conferred previously by operation of law.” 129
This approach is an example of the naïve-realism in law, for by “operation
of law” it implies that there is some sort of “law” existing out there (i.e. beyond
human psyche) in itself and capable of “conferring” legal personality upon the
candidates. 130 In reality this “conferral” of legal personality, as well as
“acknowledgment of an existing state of law and fact” occurs in the human
mind. 131 A case of unrecognized states is indicative here, because in the minds
of some individuals they are states, whereas in the minds of others they are not.
Constitutive theory of recognition, which has fallen out of favor with the
contemporary legal theorists, in its “extreme form . . . implies that the very
personality of a state depends on the political decision of other states.” 132
Is this theory more correct than the declaratory theory?
126. Tomuschat, supra note 123, at 36.
127. Id.
128. MILENA STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
120 (2013).
129. CRAWFORD, supra note 90, at 145.
130. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 9–11.
131. Id. at 11.
132. CRAWFORD, supra note 90, at 145.
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When we take as an example such a “community” as ISIS, then yes, because
despite all the attributes of a state (territory, population, and government), the
states (to be precise, their leaders) have taken the “political decision” not to
recognize it as a state, but to consider it to be an international terroristic
organization.
In the literature connected with the issue of recognition were considered the
concepts of such states as: de facto state and quasi-state. 133
De facto states, according to Scott Pegg, are “entities which feature longterm, effective, and popularly-supported organized political leadership that
provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial
area,” which “seek international recognition and view themselves as capable of
meeting the obligations of sovereign statehood.” 134
Among examples of such de facto states this author mentions: Eritrea before
independence, the republic of Somaliland, the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, Biafra, Chechnya, Krajina, Taiwan, Kosovo, and South Sudan. 135
Among these de facto states, Eritrea and South Sudan gained broad recognition
by becoming UN member-states. 136
The so called “quasi-states” are viewed as the flip-side of the de facto states
coin. Quasi-states, in contrast to de facto states, are primarily juridical. 137 The
quasi-states are internationally recognized, are UN members and regarded as
sovereign states, but they do not function positively as viable governing
entities. 138 Sometimes in the territory of a quasi-state might be a de facto state. 139
To put it differently, when we talk about the dichotomy of de facto state and
quasi-state, we have an issue of social reality versus legal form.
The issue of whether a de facto state is a subject of international law boils
down to the question of “whether statehood is considered a fact existing outside
the realm of law or whether it is a legal status determined by law.” 140 According
to Roland Portmann:
133. SCOTT PEGG, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE DE FACTO STATE 4 (1998).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 249.
136. Patrick Worsnip, South Sudan admitted to U.N. as 193rd Member, REUTERS (Sept. 27,
2019), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-sudan-un-membership/south-sudan-admitted-to-u-n-as19
3rd-member-idUKTRE76D3I120110714 [https://perma.cc/7HTS-5WXE]; UN welcomes South
Sudan as 193rd Member State, UN NEWS (Sept. 27, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/07/
381552 [https://perma.cc/C7ZK-BPZF]; Eritrea Becomes a Member of the United Nations, S.
AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/eritreabecomes-member-united-nations [https://perma.cc/BJ3K-F8VG].
137. ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
THE THIRD WORLD 21 (1990).
138. Id.
139. DE FACTO STATES: THE QUEST FOR SOVEREIGNTY 130 (Tozun Bahcheli, et al. eds.,
2004).
140. ROLAND PORTMANN, LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 (2010).
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[S]tatehood is not simply a matter of effectiveness, but is to a considerable
degree regulated by international law. A state does not simply exist as a matter
of fact: the existence of a state is determined by meeting international legal
standards and failure to do so implies denial of statehood in international law.
The state is then not a given fact from which international law simply starts, but
a legal entity deriving its status and its powers from the international legal
system itself. 141

However, in this definition of statehood we once again have circularity.
When to understand what the state (or statehood) is, we need first to know what
international law (or international legal system) is; but to know what
international law is we need to have a concept of the state in advance because
international law is created by the states and governs relations between them.
Besides, proceeding from the abovementioned definition, we also need to know
who is that person or institution (social or legal) that would decide on whether
or not the given social entity meets “international legal standards” of statehood.
According to Professor Portmann, “statehood is a legal status derived from
or denied by international norms.” 142 Here again we might ask a question: who
exactly grants or denies this legal status? “International norms” as such, or
individuals who represent states and who interpret and apply international
norms?
In reality, the existence of a state for other states (to be more precise for the
statesmen representing their states) might depend on their recognition of the
given entity as a state. 143
Psychological theory of law offers the following explanation of the issue of
recognition in international law.
Recognition in international law is a normative fact which creates a change
in the individual and national legal mind (psyche, consciousness). 144 By means
of this normative fact takes place the change of attitude of individuals with
respect to a social fact (de facto state). 145 In other words, recognition, as a
normative fact, creates in the minds of people the psychical representation of the
given community as a state under international law. In this sense recognition as
a normative fact is constitutive.
There are several kinds of such normative facts. The first kind of normative
fact is recognition of a given state by the certain government by means of the act
of national legislation. 146 Of special interest and importance is recognition

141. Id. at 253.
142. Id. at 254.
143. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 43, at 477.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 THE AM. J.
INT’L L. 605, 605 (1941).
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granted by the state to the secessionist entity in its territory. 147 An example of
this is Russia’s recognition of the independence of Chechnya in 1996. Such a
recognition might stop a bloody war for independence of a secessionist
movement and lead to the psychical revolution in the minds of people.
Second, there is recognition by means of the admission of a given
community to the UN membership. 148 In this case such an admission is viewed
as the most authoritative normative fact. 149
Sometimes an advisory opinion of the UN International Court of Justice can
be a normative fact, to which statespersons and politicians can refer to prove the
international-legal existence of a state. 150 A known example of that is the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Kosovo’s
declaration of independence. 151
Recognition of a state can also be collective and take the form of the joint
declaration (i.e., normative fact), as was the case after the First World War with
the declaration issued by the Allied Supreme Council. 152
C. The Concept of Sovereignty in International Law
Sovereignty, as was pointed out above, is a cornerstone of the whole system
of international law without which it cannot exist, because international law by
its nature is a system of law governing relations between sovereign entities. 153
It can even be argued that international law was born with sovereignty and that
it will wither away along with sovereignty.
Despite this, the very concept of the sovereignty seems unclear and
controversial. So, for example, one of the leading researchers of this concept
defined the sovereignty as a “specific feature of the state or the state power, due
to which it is legally highest and independent.” 154
In other words, the sovereignty is ascribed to the state, or ascribed to its
power, as a certain feature or quality. Hence, everything depends on how we
define the state: as a psychical phenomenon, as a social phenomenon, or as a set
of legal rules.
It means that we have not one, but three different concepts of sovereignty:
(1) juridical-dogmatic concept, (2) psychological, and (3) sociological.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

DUGARD, supra note 81, at 181.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 205–06.
Id.
CRAWFORD, supra note 90, at 150.
HERMANN MOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY 15 (1980).
N.N. PALIENKO, SUVERENITET, ISTORICHESKOE RAZVITIE IDEI SUVERENITETA I JEJA
PRAVOVOE ZNACHENIE XXI-XIII (1903).
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The juridical-dogmatic concept of sovereignty might be purely symbolic,
even formalistic and sometimes having nothing to do with the social reality. 155
An interesting illustration presents the case of Ukraine’s sovereignty before
declaration of independence in 1991.
Symbolic sovereignty, as expressed in the text of the constitutions of the
USSR and Soviet Ukraine (which was a sort of dormant constitutional norm),
was used as a normative fact by Ukrainian political elites in 1991 to proclaim
independence and to create a truly sovereign state. 156
In this example we see a contradiction between the juridical-dogmatic
concept of the Ukrainian state, as expressed in the Ukraine’s and Soviet
constitutions, on the one hand, and the social reality, on the other hand. We can
say that in the case of Ukraine, the juridical-dogmatic concept of sovereignty
had transformed into the social reality only then, when in the collective psyche
of the Ukrainian elites the highest authority (supremacy of power) had shifted
from the USSR (government in Moscow) to the Ukraine (government in Kyiv).
Supremacy of power can be explained in the terms of the psychological
theory by the natural tendency of a human being in the case of conflicting
commands from different subjects to obey only one of these subjects. 157 Here is
how Petrażycki explains this tendency:
Endowing more than one subject with the right to exert authority over identical
subordinates would, in accordance with the attributive and adversary nature of
the law, lead to more or less sharp (and possibly sanguinary) conflicts if the
various persons possessing that authority could issue different (perhaps
diametrically opposed) commands with a like claim to require the execution
thereof. Characteristically, the legal consciousness tends so to adapt the relevant
convictions and the actual experiences (the consciousness of a duty of
subordination and of a right to obedience) that in individual cases—in particular
where the orders of various superiors are contradictory—the actual duty of
obedience is acknowledged with regard to one, and not to two or more, of those
who issue the commands. In precisely the same manner, the legal consciousness
of those who issue the commands ordinarily the idea that substantially diverse
commands of others be obeyed at the same time. Thereby conflicts are
prevented. 158

Thus, within the given territory of a state, the holder of the supreme power
(a sovereign) is he to whom the legal consciousness of the majority of a
155. Marcus Benzing, Sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect in International Criminal Law,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY: NEW CHALLENGES AND THE NEED FOR REFORM? 17, 17 (Doris
Königet al. eds., 2008).
156. KATARYNA WOLCZUK, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTION MAKING IN UKRAINE IN
CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE. DYNAMICS OF POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION, 120 (Taras Kuzio
ed., 1998)
157. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7 at 132–33.
158. Id.
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population acknowledges the duty of obedience. 159 To secure this obedience, a
state apparatus might use different instruments and mechanisms, including
persuasion, propaganda, manipulation, terror, and “brainwashing.” 160 If
democratic states rely more on persuasion, the dictatorial and totalitarian
regimes might reach for open terror and “brainwashing.” 161
Where does an individual get the deceptive feeling of the “objectivity” of
the sovereign’s power from? The fact is that the behavior of those people who
surround this individual creates in his mind an additional psychical pressure to
obey the commands of the sovereign. 162 An individual is psychologically prone
to follow the pattern of behavior of people surrounding him. There is something
which Petrażycki called “the emotional-intellectual contagion (infection).” 163
Under the influence of this “contagion” an individual is inclined to obey the
sovereign. 164
If a population of a given state splits with regard to its obedience to different
centers of power within the state, it might lead to civil war and state’s
disintegration, as was the case with the former Yugoslavia. 165
What is called sovereignty in international legal theory Petrażycki called
“supreme social authority” and defined it as the “general social authority above
which there is none in the hierarchy—so that the subject of this authority is
bound to be concerned about the general welfare only as regards subordinates or
definite social groups—but not as regards any subject of higher authority.” 166
Supreme power in the state might be ascribed by national legal mentality to
various beings (to the gods, prince, king, parliament, president, etc.). 167
It is noteworthy that Kelsen’s concept of sovereignty bears a striking
resemblance to that of Petrażycki. First of all, Kelsen argues that in the “world
of physical reality, there is no such thing as sovereignty.” 168 Hence, we can argue
that sovereignty belongs to the realm of the psychical reality. This point finds
corroboration in the following words by Kelsen: “The state is sovereign if we
conceive it to be sovereign, if we conceive the order of the state to be highest. It
159. Id.
160. Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, https://www.marxists.org/
reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm [https://perma.cc/CG2W-TZZE] (last visited Oct.
4, 2019).
161. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 82 (1957).
162. NICHOLAS S. TIMASHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 186–187
(2002).
163. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 329.
164. Id.
165. POLITICAL LOYALTY AND THE NATION-STATE 13 (Michael Waller & Andrew Linklater
eds., 2003).
166. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 133.
167. Id. at 135.
168. HANS KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 78 (1942).
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is not sovereign if we proceed from a different assumption.” 169 The words “we
conceive” in this phrase indicate to us that we deal here with a psychical
experience. Besides, just like Petrażycki, to Kelsen the term “sovereignty”
means “the highest authority.” 170
According to some theorists of international law, behind the concept of
sovereignty is the state’s “competence-competence,” i.e. the full state’s ability
to determine the forms in which the state’s functions are performed. 171 This
state’s ability (i.e. sovereignty) does not emerge from the state’s selfdetermination, but from international law. 172
German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch in his “Rechtsphisophie” also
argued that sovereignty is nothing but an “international legal feature of the
subject” and that “the state is a subject of international law not because it is
sovereign, but, on the contrary, it is sovereign because it is a subject of
international law.” 173 Radbruch was confident that the notion of sovereignty
should be developed not from natural legal views independently from
international law, but rather directly from international law, following its
method. 174
If we accept the thesis that sovereignty is derived from international law
then we ascribe in our psyche sovereignty (i.e. the highest authority) not to the
state but to the abstract idea of international law or to the international
community. In this case the object of representation of the international law or
international community manifests itself as a sort of God who bestows upon
states the highest authority. Logically, we have a vicious circle here because
sovereign states create international law and international law confers
sovereignty upon the states.
Criticizing the concept that the state is sovereign when its power is limited
solely by international law Alf Ross wrote:
The attempt to characterize the subject of International Law, the sovereign state,
by the criterion of “sole subjection to International Law” is evidently
meaningless if with the prevailing doctrine we take it for granted—as most of
the adherents of the theory do—that International Law is defined as the law
binding upon states. It is said first that International Law is the law binding upon
states; next that states are the communities which are bound solely by
International Law. This is evidently a vicious circle. In order to decide whether
or not a community is a (sovereign) state we must first know whether or not the
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 77.
171. ROMAN KWIECIEŃ, SUWERENNOŚĆ PAŃSTWA, REKONSTRUKCJA I ZNACZENIE IDEI W
PRAWIE MIĘDZYNARODOWYM 196 (2004); ZAKAMYCZE, KANTOR WYDAWNICZY ZAKAMYCZE,
196 (2004).
172. Id.
173. GUSTAV RADRBRUCH, FILOSOFIA PRAVA 216 (2004).
174. Id.
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rules by which it is bound are international. But to know whether or not a rule is
international we must first know whether or not the subjects bound by it are
(sovereign) states. It is a disgrace to us that such an obvious absurdity marks the
current theory of International Law. 175

Thus, the concept of sovereignty means a certain psychical experience,
when individuals (subjects of the sovereign) ascribe the highest authority (the
supreme power) to this sovereign, who can be a person (e.g. a monarch or a
president), a group of persons (e.g. a government), an imaginary person (e.g.
God), or an idea (e.g. idea of law). 176 On the other hand, the sovereign (e.g. a
person to whom collective legal consciousness ascribes the highest authority)
might ascribe to himself certain “sovereign” rights and duties to other
individuals or groups of persons. 177 He might ascribe to other states a duty not
to interfere with his state’s internal or external affairs (to be more precise, in
what he considers to be those affairs). 178 Hence we have a concept of two aspects
of sovereignty in the mind of the sovereign: (1) an internal aspect (i.e. an idea
about the right to the supreme and exclusive authority within a state’s territory),
and (2) an external aspect (a duty ascribed to other states and persons not to
interfere into what he considers to be his exclusive competence). 179
These two aspects of sovereignty are sometimes described as negative and
positive sovereignty. 180
In the terms of the psychological theory, a person who considers himself to
be a representative of a sovereign state (e.g. a head of the state, prime-minister,
or a minister of foreign affairs) typically ascribes to his state the following rights
in international relations: the right to be treated as equal to other states; the right
of respect from other states and their representatives; and the right not to be
attacked by military force of the other state. 181 On the other hand, he ascribes to
other states and their representatives the corresponding duties. 182
At the same time, some states’ leaders might ascribe to themselves and to
their states some rights which do not exist in the eyes of other leaders, which
might lead to international conflicts. 183 For instance, a head of a powerful state
might ascribe to his state the right to interfere into the affairs of those

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

ROSS, supra note 12, at 41.
PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id.
THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER & CYNTHIA WEBER, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL
CONSTRUCT 9–10 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996).
180. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND THE THIRD WORLD 26–31 (1996).
181. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 42, at 477.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 147–48.
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neighboring states which he considers to be within the sphere of his country’s
“special” interests. 184
II. SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTELLECTUAL STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL-LEGAL EXPERIENCE
In the contemporary international-legal theory subject of international law
is typically defined as an entity possessing international rights and obligations,
and having the capacity to: (a) maintain its rights by bringing international
claims; and (b) to be responsible for its breaches of international legal
obligations. 185 However, as James Crawford notes, this definition, though
conventional, is circular since, “while the indicia referred to depend in theory on
the existence of a legal person, the main way of determining whether the relevant
capacity exists in case of doubt is to inquire whether it is in fact exercised.” 186
The international-legal doctrine is helpless in the face of the need to explain
the legal nature of such “anomalous” subjects of international law as “belligerent
communities,” “governments in exile,” the Sovereign Order of Malta, Taiwan,
etc. 187 This helplessness manifests itself in the use of the term “entities sui
generis,” because legal theorists do not know under which theoretical heading
to place these entities. 188 For example, in the case of civil war in a state, the other
states might recognize as a legitimate representative of the given state, not its
government, but an armed opposition (e.g. civil war in Syria). A “government
in exile” might be recognized as a legitimate representative of state A by state B
but not by state C.
Taiwan is officially considered by many states as a part of the territory of
the People’s Republic of China and at the same time as a separate subject for
some purposes (e.g. as a “fishing entity” for law of the sea and as separate
customs territory for the WTO’s membership). 189 The Sovereign Order of Malta,
lacking state territory and population, nevertheless maintains diplomatic
relations with more than one hundred states. 190
There are also such anomalous entities to which international law ascribes
certain rights as “the international community as a whole,” “mankind,” and the
“future generations.” 191
184. SUSANNA HAST, SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: HISTORY,
THEORY AND POLITICS 90 (2016).
185. CRAWFORD, supra note 90, at 105.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 114–15.
188. Id. at 114.
189. Id. at 115.
190. Noel Cox, The Acquisition of Sovereignty by Quasi-States: The Case of the Order of Malta
MOUNTBATTEN J. LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming).
191. KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (1998).
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According to the ICJ, erga omnes obligations are those obligations that a
state has toward “the international community as a whole.” 192 In other words, in
the minds of the ICJ judges, “the international community” is a psychical
representation to which they ascribe certain rights. 193 Mankind, as another
psychical representation, in the minds of individuals possesses “heritage.” 194
In international environmental law, the “future generations” which are not
yet born, have certain rights (e.g., access to the cultural and natural resources
which the current generation enjoy). 195 For instance, the Philippine Supreme
Court in Manila held that:
[E]very generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come. 196

In national law, rights and legal personality can be ascribed even to rivers,
ecosystems, and nature. 197 Traditional legal theory equally stands helpless
before these anomalous subjects of law, not being able to explain their true
nature.
The true legal nature of these “anomalous” entities, for the legal scholars,
can be explained only by the psychological theory of law. From the standpoint
of the psychological theory of law, the subject of international law can be
defined as an object of representations in the human psyche to which a given
individual ascribes rights and obligations in the field of international relations. 198
As for the concept of international relations, it has to do with the belief (which
may exist or not in social reality) that the given subjects of international law (e.g.
states) are in legal relations with one another. 199
For an individual (e.g. international-legal theorist) to whom the primary
subjects of international law are states, all other subjects of international law
192. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain) Judgment, 1970
I.C.J. Rep. 50 ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).
193. Ardit Memeti & Bekim Nuhija, The Concept of Erga Omnes Obligations in International
Law, Nᴇᴡ Bᴀʟᴋᴀɴ Pᴏʟɪᴛɪᴄs, https://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/item/the-concept-of-ergaomnes-obligations-in-international-law#.XZuE9uf0kWo [https://perma.cc/Y6QX-QWWU] (last
visited Oct. 7, 2019).
194. BASLAR, supra note 191, at 71.
195. Simone Borg, Guarding Intergenerational Rights Over Natural Resources, in Future
Generations and International Law (Emmanuel Agius, et al. eds., 1998).
196. Minors Oposa v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Env’t and Nat. Res., G.R. No. 101083 (July 30,
1993) (Phil.).
197. Robin R Milam, Rivers and Natural Ecosystems as Rights Bearing Subjects, Tʜᴇ Rɪɢʜᴛs
ᴏғ Nᴀᴛᴜʀᴇ, https://therightsofnature.org/rivers-and-natural-ecosystems-as-rights-bearing-subjects/
[https://perma.cc/LL9G-N5U5] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).
198. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 43, at 325.
199. Id. at 332.
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might by experienced as those entities which are recognized as subjects by the
states and who depend upon these states for their “existence.” 200 In this psyche,
states as objects of representation create other subjects of international law or
“recognize” their existence. 201
Other individuals might ascribe rights and obligations under international
law directly to various beings. 202 There are also individuals who consider the
international legal community of states as a whole as an authority which
conferred international legal subjectivity upon various entities. 203
In case of a disagreement about the “existence” of a particular subject of
international law, the international lawyer often tries to find and refers to the
corresponding normative fact in order to substantiate his or her position, (e.g.,
he or she might refer to the court’s decision or an international treaty). For
example, to substantiate the view that an international governmental
organization (e.g. the UN) is a subject of international law, international lawyers
refers to the advisory opinion of the ICJ: “Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations.” 204
As was mentioned, supra, Hans Kelsen has drawn parallels between the
concept of state and the concept of juridical person. 205 This comparison might
be helpful for us to explain the true nature of the concept of the subject of
international law or international-legal person in legal theory.
From the perspective of the psychological theory of law, most of the
concepts of juristic persons in the legal scholarship are naïve-realistic because
those subjects of law (e.g. juristic persons) are naively dealt with as realities
actually existent, or, on the other hand, these concepts can be “naïve-nihilistic,
insofar as—failing to find in the external world anything real which seems
appropriate—they concede the impossibility of finding, and refuse to believe
that there exist, innumerable subjects of rights (which undoubtedly do exist or
have previously existed.)” 206
The modern legal science, continues Petrażycki, mistakenly denies the
“existence (actual or potential) of all those categories of subjects not coming
under the heading of ‘living people,’ ‘physical persons,’ ‘human organizations,’
or ‘juristic persons,’ which (particularly in earlier stages of culture, including

200. GIOVANNI DISTEFANO, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SKETCH OF
56 (2019).
201. Id.
202. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 43, at 312, 333.
203. Kᴇʟsᴇɴ, supra note 3, at 173.
204. Reparation For Injuries Suffered in The Service of The United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 9 (Apr. 11, 1949).
205. Kᴇʟsᴇɴ, supra note 13, at 105–06.
206. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 186.
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the Middle Ages) played an important part in the legal mentality and in official
law . . . .” 207
Such an attitude of the modern legal theory, which is also characteristic for
the international-legal theory, is unscientific because it ignores early forms of
international law. Such as ancient international law (e.g. international law of the
Sumerian civilization), which was primarily viewed by the ancient mind as law
between deities standing behind city-states. 208
Petrażycki also states that “the existence of a social organism is not a
condition precedent to the emergence of juristic person.” 209
Petrażycki criticized naïve-constructivist teachings on the subjects of law,
which instead of exploring actually existing phenomena in the sphere of their
real existence (which is human psyche), are building different fantastic creatures
in the inappropriate spheres (e.g., theories of “social organisms,” theories of
different kinds of metaphysical “wills,” etc.). 210
It is worth recalling that the Soviet theory of international law viewed its
essence in “the concordance of the wills of states.” 211
The truly scientific doctrine of subjects of law, according to Petrażycki, can
be built only when we seek subjects of law in the mind of a person who ascribes
to these “subjects” rights and obligations and not in some kind of “external
reality.” 212 Petrażycki points out: “As in other fields of legal science, the sphere
where the relevant phenomena are found and studied is transferred from the
external world to the mind of the person experiencing legal processes and
ascribing obligations and rights to various beings . . . .” 213
For example, in the field of international law, rights and obligations are
ascribed to such phenomena as “future generations,” “mankind,” “national
minorities,” “indigenous peoples,” “Sovereign Military Order of Malta,” etc. 214
As Petrażycki points out, when jurists ascribe to juristic and physical
persons certain rights and obligations—when they experience the corresponding
legal judgment—they actually have the relevant subjects “extremely close at
hand,” in their minds, where it is very easy to become acquainted with their
nature. 215 Using “the treasury has such and such rights” as an illustration of his
point, Petrażycki holds that the subject of the right ascribed is the logical subject
of this judgment—that is conceived of and to which is referred the logical
207. Id.
208. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY 22–23 (2001).
209. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 182.
210. Id. at 186–87.
211. G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 214 (William E. Butler trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 1974).
212. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 188.
213. Id.
214. CRAWFORD, supra note 90, at 114–15.
215. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 185.
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predicate: “has the right;” the content or object of the idea to which the word
“treasury” corresponds. 216 He stresses the point that “treasury” here is
undoubtedly “the real, logical, and juristic subject.” 217 This line of reasoning by
Petrażycki is applicable to the subjects of international law, which also exist as
logical and juristic subjects of the judgments. For example, it would be futile to
look for the “future generations” as a person or thing to which mankind owes
certain obligations with respect to protection of the environment, in the external
world, but, nevertheless, “future generations” are real in a sense of being a
logical and juristic subject.
Of particular interest to us is the old debate between international-legal
scholars regarding the question whether a human being is a subject of
international law. To some scholars, a human being (natural person) is not a
subject but merely an object of international law. 218 To others, individuals are
“derivative” subjects in that they draw their existence from the formal decisions
of other subjects, primarily states. 219 The third group of scholars sees in
individuals the only actors and subjects of international law. 220
One of the common mistakes made by the scholars in their assessment of an
individual as a subject of international law is related to what Petrażycki calls
“the (mistakenly) realistic doctrine of ‘physical’ subjects of law (‘living human
individuals’).” 221
The truth is that an individual (human being or natural person) is a subject
of international law only as a logical or grammatical subject existing in our
minds (i.e. as a psychical representation) and not as a “living human
individual.” 222
According to Petrażycki, the intellectual structure of the legal mentality
(legal psychical experience) comprises of the following elements:
(1) Object ideas (i.e. psychical representations)—ideas: (a) of objects of
obligations (of obligatory actions), and (b) of objects of rights (of acquisitions
which are due and owing);
(2) Subject ideas—ideas: (a) of subjects of obligations, and (b) of subjects
of rights;

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. JOHN A. C. CARTNER ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SHIPMASTER 20 (2009).
219. WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 336
(1990).
220. Nicolas Leroux, Non-state Actors in French Legal Scholarship: International Legal
Personality in Question, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE
PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011).
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(3) Ideas of relevant legal facts; and
(4) Ideas of normative facts. 223
This scheme of the intellectual structure of law, which is complete and
exhaustive, is applicable to international law. This scheme allows us to answer
the following questions in the field of international legal relations: (1) who is
bound (who is the subject of the international-legal obligation)?; (2) to what
action or actions is this subject bound (what is the object of the international
legal obligation)?; (3) who is the subject of the relevant right?; and (4) to what
does the subject have a right—what is due to him (the object of the right)?
Answering these questions helps us to better understand the essence of the
subjects of international law and their rights and obligations under international
law.
A.

The Relationship Between International and National Law

In international-legal theory there are several competing approaches striving
to explain the relationship between international and national law; in particular,
trying to answer the question of which rules of law, international or national,
should take precedence in a case of conflict between these rules.
The proponents of the dualistic approach claim that international and
national law are two distinct legal orders, having nothing to do with each
other. 224 These two legal orders have different objects (the subject matter) of
regulation (i.e., interstate relations in case of international law and intrastate
relations in case of national law), different subjects (i.e., primarily states and
international organizations in case of international law and private persons
[natural and legal persons] in case of national law), and different sources (e.g.,
treaties and customs in international law and, mostly, acts of legislation in case
of national law). 225 The dualistic approach, which seems rather popular among
international-legal scholars, does not give a direct answer to the question of
which legal norm, international or national, should be applied in the case of a
conflict between them. Theoretically assuming that international law and
national law are two different legal systems regulating different kinds of social
relations, there cannot be any conflict between them. At the same time, the
proponents of dualism might argue that in the realm of national law
international-legal rules can be applied only on the basis of national-legal
rules—for example, on the basis of the constitutional norms.

223. Id. at 58–59.
224. Andreas L. Paulus, The Emergence of the International Community and the Divide
Between International and Domestic Law, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (André Nollkaemper & Janne Elisabeth Nijman eds.,
2007).
225. D.B. LEVIN, AKTUALNYE PROBLEM TEORII MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA, Moscow:
Nauka, 195–196 (1974).
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The monistic approach to the relationship between international and national
law postulates that both laws constitute one single legal system, something like
a hierarchically organized pyramid of legal norms. 226 The question is only about
what law (international or national) should be at the apex of this legal pyramid.
In Kelsen’s legal theory, international and national law are parts of one legal
system, with primacy belonging to the international-legal rules. 227 To Kelsen, in
this hierarchy of legal norms the lower-level legal norms derive their validity
from the validity of the higher legal norms, thereby logically leading to a single
basic norm, which is not real but “hypothetical.” 228 What this “basic norm” is
remains somewhat a mystery, because initially Kelsen put at the top of the legal
pyramid a general principle of law and one of the fundamental principles of
international law “pacta sunt servanda,” but later on came up with logically
circular “basic norm” according to which: “The states ought to behave as they
have customarily behaved.” 229
In reality, however, for the judges of national courts even in those legal
systems which are regarded as “monistic,” and in which the primacy in case of
a conflict between international treaties and national law belongs to the former,
the part of “the basic norm” is played by constitution. 230
From the psychological perspective, to understand the relationship between
international and national law we need to look at this issue from two different
angles: the point of view of an international lawyer (e.g., a judge of an
international court) and, on the other hand, from the perspective of a national
lawyer (e.g., a judge of a national court).
An individual has a natural psychological tendency to build in his mind a
hierarchy of normative facts. For example, a judge of an international court tends
to view himself as an organ of international justice or a servant to international
law. In other words, he is inclined to give primacy to international, rather than
national law. From his perspective in the case of a conflict between
international-legal and national-legal rules the priority will belong to
international-legal rules, especially to such as the UN Charter, basic principles
of international law, as expressed in such normative facts as the “Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (1970) and
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the Helsinki Final Act, as well as norms jus cogens and obligations erga
omnes. 231
To give priority to an international treaty, the judge of an international court
can refer as to authoritative normative facts to the articles 26 and 27 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, according to which “[e]very treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith” (Art. 26) and the state “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” 232
In a word, in the mind of an international lawyer, international-legal facts
take precedence over national-legal normative facts.
The picture in the mind of a national lawyer might look differently. For
instance, to the judge of the national court, the highest authority as a normative
fact is the national constitution. Unlike the international lawyer, who tends to
view the international treaty as one normative fact, in the eyes of the national
judge there are three different normative facts: international inter-state treaties,
international inter-governmental treaties, and international agreements of interministerial character. 233 In the mind of the national judge the hierarchy between
international and national normative facts is more complicated and he tends to
apply international normative facts insofar as it is required by the national
normative facts. 234
In summary, there is no issue about the relationship between international
and national law but rather an issue of how to build the hierarchy of international
and national normative facts; constructing this hierarchy the national and
international lawyers tend to proceed from different assumptions. The
international lawyer assumes that the hierarchy of normative facts should be
built with the preference for international normative facts, whereas the national
lawyer gives preference to the national normative facts but first of all to national
constitution. 235

231. ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 152
(2011).
232. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (available
at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB
9B-HW4M]).
233. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 15 (3d ed. 2013).
234. NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 231, at 151.
235. Sibilla Bondolfi, Controversy in Parliament: Put National Law Before International Law?
Other Countries Do, SWI (May 30, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/directdemocra
cy/controversy-in-parliament-_put-national-law-before-international-law—other-countries-do-/44
154932 [https://perma.cc/37CY-7Z8S]; Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The
Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57,
75 (2011).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2019]

THE MYSTERY OF THE STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

57

III. CONCLUSION
The psychological theory of international law allows us not only to shed new
light on the most important issues of the international-legal theory and practice,
which cannot be solved by the traditional theory of international law, but also
lays the necessary groundwork for the creation of the true science of
international law.
The future of international law to a great extent depends on whether or not
the new science of this law will be built, and this science should be based upon
three pillars: (1) psychological theory of international law; (2) sociological
theory of international law; and (3) juridical-dogmatic theory of international
law.
To become the science in the true sense of the word, international law should
jettison those quasi-scientific theories which are rooted in the logical errors as
to the true nature of law and to use the psychological theory of law’s
methodology as a reliable instrument of the scientific research.
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